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The management of the exchange rate is possible only if the government
pursues a monetary-fiscal policy mix which is consistent with its exchange
rate targets. In this paper with uncertainty concerning the length of
individual life the real consequences of exchange rate management depend
on the precise time pattern of the accompanying policies. We look at a
stylized example of disinflation by means of exchange rate targetting with
an initial overvalued currency and a delayed accompanying absorbtion policy.
The result will be an intergenerational redistribution of welfare whereby
spending rises during the initial period and falls during later periods,
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1. INTRODUCTION
It is now well understood that exchange rates cannot be managed without
the pursuit of other policies which make the entire package internally
consistent (e.g. Pollak (1957)). Governments or central banks can only
temporarily target exchange rates without giving due attention to other
policies. However, eventually they will have to choose or will be forced to
chooce measures which validate ex—post the feasibility of their exchange rate
policy. These measures will typically be anticipated by economic agents
during the initial periods of exchange rate management and those anticipations
will translate into immediatee pressure in various markets. Hence, the
success of exchange rate management depends to a large extent on other
policies, commitments to future policies, and its effects on expectations.
In this paper we study the intertemporal constraints on exchange rate
management for economies in which governments precommit themselves to the
future course of monetary and fiscal policies and honor their commitments. We
explore the implication of such policy packages in terms of their effects on
the time pattern of spending and debt.
In order to obtain real effects of exchange rate management policies we
do away with the Ricardo—Barro type neutrality (see Barro (1974)) by
considering consumers with finitely expected lifetime, as in Blanchard
*Thiswork was financed by a grant from the Horrowitz Institute2
(1984). It is known that in the presence of Ricardo—Barro type neutrality
exchanqe rate management tias no real effects (see, for example, Helpman and
Razin (1979)). On the other hand, this neutrality breaks down in the presence
of various distortions, in which case exchange rate management does have real
effects (see, for example, Aschauer and Greenwood (1981) and Helpman and Razin
(1984)), but we do not wish to consider such distortions in the present study.
In addition to the general feasibility constraints that result from the
fact that the real consequences of exchange rate management depend on the
precise time pattern of the policies that support the exchange rate path, we
study an example in which disinflation is achieved by means of an exchange
ratefreeze. This is an interesting case because several countries have
recently attempted to disinflate by means of exchange rate targetting (e.g.
Argentina,Chile, Israel). We show that when this policy is pursued with an
initially overvalued currency and a delayed accompanying absorption policy,
the result will be higher spending during the initial periods following the
inception of exchange rate management, lower spending in later periods, and
larger aggregate foreign debt in all time periods. The twist in the time
profile of spending and the upward shift in the time profile of debt will be
larger the larger the initial overvaluation and the longer the delay in the
absorption policy. However, the delay in the absorption policy is bounded by
the government's taxing capacity. The beneficiaries of this policy
combination are individuals who are alive during its inception, while future
generations suffer.
In our framework the time pattern of real variables does not depend on
monetary policy if the exchange rate is freely floated and in this case the
allocation of resources is efficient. Efficiency is also preserved when the
exchange rate is managed, but the time pattern of real variables does3
depend on the policies that support the exchange rate path (contrast with
Helprnan and Razin (1979), Helpman (1981) and Lucas (1982)). As pointed out
above, these supporting policies do affect the intergenerational distribution
of welfare. Hence, in this framework there are significant differences
between a managed and a floating exchange rate regime. The real effects of
exchange rate targetting that we describe are closely related to the real
effects of budget financing that were discussed by Blanchard (1984) and
Frenkel and Razin (1984) in frameworks without money. We, naturally, take
explicit account of monetary considerations.
We begin our discussion with a description of the economy in a floating
exchange rate regime. In this regime monetary injections and withdrawals
through the tax—transfer system have no real effects. This is followed by a
detailed discussion of the channel through which exchange rate management has
real effects and an illustration of the disinflation policy.
2. Floating Exchange Rate
We consider an economy with overlapping generations in which a cohort of
size 1 is born in every period. Individuals survive to the next period with
probability -rand this probability is age independent. The event of death
is independent across individuals. Therefore, the proportion of a cohort
alive at time t1 which survives to periodt2 is:
(t2-_t1)
Y4




individualsof age a. The size of the population is also constant and equal
to:
=
Weassume that those individuals live in a small country facing a given
one—period world real interest rate r on sure loans in terms of traded
goods. All loans are indexed and foreign prices of traded goods are constant
and equal to one. Thus if one borrows b he has to repay Rb the next
period, where R =1+ris the interest factor. Since an individual survives
to the next period only with probability y,hecannot obtain a loan with
this interest rate. Foreign financial institutions who lend to domestic
residents will obtain a sure repayment Rb if they charge a real interest
rate of:
I
Inorder to see this, suppose that b is being lent to every individual of a
given cohort. Then those who will survive to the next period will repay
I5
However, only a proportion yofthe individuals will survive. Therefore
total payments by the cohort will be Rb. Clearly, (RIy) —1is the
risk—adjusted real interest rate (see Blanchard (1984)).
There exist firms that produceT units of traded goods per capita
and units of nontraded goods per capita. The sectoral output levels
are functions of the relative price of nontradables Pt and so in CNP per
captita in terms of traded goods, which we denote by Clearly,
dy(pt)dpt =
Firmssell their output in exchange for domestic money and distribute the
proceeds to the living individuals at the beginning of the following period.
Individuals have to pay for goods with money; with home money for home goods
and foreign money for foreign goods. Thus, we assume a system with
cash—in—advance constraints in which goods are bought with the seller's
currency (see Helpinan and Razin (1984) for a discussion of alternative
monetary mechanisms).








is his total consumption in terms of
traded goods; ba,t is his new debt;(R/Y)ba_i,t_i is his repayment of
old debts, with period minus one debt equal to zero; i.e., b..j, =0for
all t; e is the exchange rate; and are the age independent nominal
taxes or transfers. We also assume in (1) that money is not used for store of
value purposes, which happens when the nominal effective interest rate is
positive. In addition we need to impose the terminal condition that
(R/Y)_Tba+T,t+T goes to zero as Tgoesto infinity.6
We assume that the government has no real spending. In a freely floating
exchange rate regime the government injects and withdraws money from the
economy via the taxes and transfers e. Hence, if mt is the per—capita
stock of money in period t, then:
=mt_i Ot
On the other hand, with positive nominal interest rates all money is spent on
goods, implying:
m =ey(p)
Taken together the last two equations imply:
(2) [eiy(pi) -o]/et
=
Using(i) and (2) it is clear that in a pure floating exchange rate
regime monetary injections and withdrawals via have no real effects.
Put differently, in this system the time pattern of consumption and debt,
individual as well as aggregate, and the real exchange rate ''t' do not
depend on the time pattern of monetary injections. This result is in line
with models in which there are no overlapping generations and individuals live
to the end of the economy's horizon (see Helpman (1981)).
We use this case as a benchmark for comparisons with exchange rate
management policies. It should though be pointed out that neutrality of the
above described monetary policy need not hold in the presence of a
labor—leisure choice or externally financed investment. It also need not hold
if the buyer's currency is used for transactions instead of the seller's (see
Helpman and Razin (1984)). Moreover, a special feature of the current7
formulation of overlapping generations is that the neutrality result also
depends on the assumption of an equal division of dividends amongst all living
individuals. It can, for example, be shown that if this is not so, and
individuals can take loans using current period output as collateral (in case
they do not survive to the next period), then monetary policy will have real
effects.
In what follows we will use the model described in this section in order
to study real effects of exchange rate management policies. We will be
interested in particular in the deviation that such policies generate from the
benchmark case.8
3. EXCHANGE RATE MANAGEMENT AND MOVEMENTS OF RESERVES
Suppose tnat in the benchmark case considered in the previous section we
obtain the following solution for per—capita consumption and debt:
=(l—i) a =(1_Y);OYa5a,t
t =—...
andthe real exchange rate {1ft},
Suppose also that in period t=O the government begins to manage the exchange
rate. The question we consider is: what are the real consequences of
exchange rate management in terms of deviations of {Ct,bt,pt} from the
benchmark case.AS we know from Helpman (1981), in a model without
overlapping generations in which individual lives extend to the economy's
horizon exchange rate management has no real effect as long as the government
is intertemporally balanced, independently of the time pattern of taxes. The
reason is that in that case the private sector fully internalizes the
government's intertemporal budget constraint. This, however, cannot be
expected in an economy in which individuals pay future taxes with a
probability smaller than one.Therefore, the time pattern of taxes required
in order to manage the exchange rate will generally have real effects (e.g.
Blanchard (1984)).
Clearly, for every time pattern of exchange rates there exists a time
pattern of taxes and transfers which preserves the benchmark real variables.
However, while in previous models (e.g. Helpman (1981)) there was no constraint on
the time pattern of the neutral taxes but only on their present value, here this
pattern is unique. As is clear from (1) and (2), if in period t=O the real9
exchange rate remains (1/) and per—capita debt does not change, then for




where e1 = Thispolicy generates monetary injections and withdrawals
which keep the money supply in line with the nominal value of output implied
by the exchange rate e and the real exchange rate i.e. it assures:
rn = —= ey(t)
with no deficits or surpluses in the overall balance of payments.
If (3) is satisfied, we have
(4) [eiy(i) -e]/e
=y(),t0,1,...
which is the same as (2), implying no change in real variables. In this case
no reserve movements are required in order to manage the exchange rate.
Observe, however, that even when the exchange rate is maintained constant over
time, varying taxes and transfers are required as long as the real exchange
rate is not constant over time. Hence, exchange rate management without real
consequences requires a well coordinated time—varying policy of monetary
injections and withdrawals. No such policy is required under a free float.10
It is clear from triis discussion that if a policy that satisfies (3) does
not accompany the exchange rate management programme there will be reserve
movements. Assuming intrerest bearing services, reserve movements qenerate
public debt which has real effects, as explained in Blanchard (1984). The





with the initial conditions:
i-.n — n- LI, '_'-._, '-'1
—
Weassume that the government repays its debts. Therefore its policy is
restricted to satisfy (5) with the terminal condition:
(6) Urn R_tb =0.
Equation (5) describes reserve (external interest bearing assets)
movements according to the standard balance of payments mechanism. External
debt grows at the rate of interest due to rollovers plus periodical additions
through deficits in the overall balance of payments, the last component being
represented by the terms in the square brackets. The first two terms describe the
decline in the overall demand for money [e 1y(p. i —ety(pt).
Part of this decline is satisfied by negative injections (withdrawals)11
via taxes o.The rest is attained via foreign exchange
purchases by the private sector, which bring about reserve losses.It is
clear from (5) that when (3) is satisfied, we obtain the solution
Pt = andb =0for all t; i.e., there are no reserve movements.
Now, suppose that the exchange rate management policy starts in period
zero and the policy rule given in (3) is not followed. Then the effects of
reserve movements on individual budget constraints can be seen from the




+ + (b -Rb1)
In order to see as clearly as possible the real effects of reserve
movements, assume that all goods are traded; i.e., N =0and
y1. Then (1) and (2) imply (using the terminal condition on ba÷Tt÷T):
(8) o(Y/R)TyT —(R/Y)ba_i,t_i
while (7) implies (using the terminal condition on ba+Tt+T and (7)):
I I
(9) O(Y/R)Tca+Tt+T =Wa,t






It is clear from a comparison of (8) with (10) that reserve movements have
real effects and that these effects depend on the time pattern of reserve
movements. Different time patterns of reserves generate different
redistributions of wealth across generations, thereby effecting the time
pattern of aggregate spending as we will show explicitly in the next section.
Observe also that -if we assume that no new cohorts are born and the
probability of survival equals one, then viewed from t=O constraint (10)
coincides with (8), which implies neutrality of the exchange rate policy.
This case coincides with that discussed in Helpman (1981).
The redistributional effect embodied in (10) can be also seen in another








It is seen from here that the real wealth of an individual born at time t
depends both on the given depreciation rates of the managed exchange rate and
on the tax rates. An individual born at t is better off the further away in
the future taxes are imposed and the exchange rate is depreciated, and the
nearer in the future transfers are given and the exchange rate is
appreciated. However, the taxes cannot be divorced from exchange rate
movements, because from (5) and (6) they have to satisfy:
(12) oR_t(ot/et) =0R_t
—ey(pt)]
where p1 = ande1 =ë,with (r)y-1- in the case of traded goods
only.Hence, the larger initial appreciations of the currency the larger the
taxes that have to be collected.13
Coming back to (11), and the case of traded goods only, observe that from
period t1 onward exchange rates and taxes are fully anticipated. However,
at time t=O, when exchange rate management begins, there is an unanticipated
change both in the exchange rate and in taxes (and in the real exchange rate
whenever there are nontraded goods). It is therefore useful to decompose the
contribution of period zero disposable income, inclusive of capital gains on
wealth, into anticipated and unanticipated components. Given the discussion
of the benchmark case it is clear that the anticipated component of real
income is T' while from (11) total real income is:
— +e1—e0
Therefore, the last two terms represent the unanticipated components, and they
can be expressed as:
0 e—e





is the unanticipated capital gain on money balances and
e —o
(13b) h =0 0
e0
is the unanticipated increase in real taxes. The definition of the real loss
due to taxes is clear from (13b), while the capital gain on money balances may
require an explanation. Before the change in the exchange rate policy the
private sector is expected to hold14
=
eOYT
money balances at the beginning of period zero. The real value of this money
was expected to be T• As a result of the unanticipated stabilization of
the exchange rate at e the real value of this money has become
eOyTIeO. Hence, (13a) describes the unexpected capital gain on
period zero money holdings.
Now, using N =0and (13) it is seen from (5) that:
(14) b =g=k—n.
Namely, the initial loss of reserves is equal to the public's unanticipated capital
gain on money holdings minus the unanticipated increase in tax obligations. In view
of (14), condition (3) for t0 (which describes the period zero
absorption policy that is required for real neutrality of the exchange rate
management policy) can be interpreted as follows: The tax rate is
chosen so as to make the unanticipated increase in tax liabilities h just
equal to the unanticipated capital gain on money balances k. When this holds
there are no initial reserve movements.
4.AN ILLUSTRATION
In order to illustrate the dynamic effects of exchange rate management,
we consider in this section an explicit example. For this purpose suppose
that there are traded goods only, and suppose that, as has been the case in
several countries (e.g. Argentina, Chile, Israel) the government decided to
reduce inflation by means of exchange rate management. For concreteness,
suppose that it freezes the exchange rate at the level e from period
zero to infinity. In this case real effects are prevented if h=k15
and =0for t=1,2,..., as can be seen from (3). Namely, perfect
price stabilization with no real effects is achieved when the government taxes
away the period zero capital gains on money holdings, and it balances its
budget in all future periods by setting taxes equal to zero. In particular,
price stability without real effects is achieved by choosing the period zero
exchange rate equal to the period minus one exchange rate and by balancing the
budget in period zero as well.
The simple policy combination that we described above is feasible only in
the simple case to which it was applied. If, for example, there are nontraded
goods in the system, then taxing away the capital gain on money holdings in
period zero and setting taxes equal to zero in all future periods will not
attain price stability, nor will it prevent real effects. As we have shown in
the previous section real neutrality requires the taxes to vary over time in
reaction to real exchange rate movements (see (3)). When other real world
complications are added as well, such as the dependence of the velocity of
circulation on the nominal interest rate, the required policy coordination for
real neutrality becomes even more complicated.
Returning to the simple case with traded goods only, we choose to analyze
the following policy experiment. Suppose that the exchange rate e is chosen
below and taxes are not changed in period zero. Starting with period
t1 no taxes are imposed until period t=T. From t=T onwards fixed real taxes
=e'/eare collected in order to pay interest on public foreign debt, so
that the government's budget is balanced for t=T, 1+1 In this case
exchange rate management begins with an overvalued currency; we wish to
explore the resulting real effects and their dependence on the timing of the
contractionary policy.
Observe that under this policy experiment:16
h =0
gk >0




i.e., the government's foreign debt grows at the rateof interest until
period T—1 and remains constant afterwards.
From (12) and (13a) we obtain the real taxes:
et =(_1)T_lg,t=T,T +1,...,
i.e., taxes from I onwards pay the interest on government foreigndebt.
Since no taxes are imposed between period 1 and 1—1, the individual budget







(17) et = U , 1< t < T—1
(R_1)RT_lg,t> T




and we drop the prime from variables in the fixed exchanqe rate regime.
Now, assume that individuals maximize expected lifetime utility:
Et=oTuka+T,t+T) =
subjectto (19), with u(.) being logarithmic. Then:
=
(l_YiS)Wa,t
and per capita consumption is:
c =(1_Y)=oY8Ca,t
=(1_Y)(1_Y);oyawa,t.
Using the right nand side of (18), we obtain:
(19) c (1_Y)[rO(Y/R)T(yT_e+T) —Rbt_i],
t > 0
and by aggregating (16) over all age groups we obtain:
(20) bt =Rbt_i
+ Ct — — et) t > 0
with the initial condition b1 =5.
Euations (19)_(20) represent a dynamic system of consumption and debt accumulation
that can be solved for every sequence In our case °0 =—gh—k represents the
difference between unanticipated taxes and capital gains, while t =1,2,...,18
represent anticipated future taxes. Tue henmark solution is
obtained by settinq e =0for all t, and it is:
t
(21) =(1-y)R{[1





Thus, if say =0and R < 1, then is declining over time and
is rising over time, both reaching a steady state as shown in Figure 1.If,
on the other hnd =Q 1 nd yR < 1 then Fisrising over —i
, — , ,
timeand is declining over time, both reaching asteadystate as shown in
Figure 2.If =0and yR > 1, then is rising and
is declining without bound; i.e., there is no steady state. If yR =1
then consumption and debt remain constant over time.
Now, for the experiment with exchange rate management that we described
above satisfies (17), and we obtain the following solution:
(1—ys)g[1— T 1(2)_t 2
R —y
(23) ct_Ft = 0< t < T—1
2—T+1


















It is clear from this solution that for g >0average consumption c. is
larger than Et for t0 and possibly for other small values of t, and that
c <fort large enough. Hence, the initial overvaluation of the currency
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future,as compared to the benchmark case. On the other hand, the initial
overvaluation of the currency makes private foreign debt lower in all
time periods. Nevertneless, a direct calculation shows that total debt
bt +bis larger than in all time periods, which means that public
debt increases by more than private debt declines. A comparison of the time
path of consumption and debt for the case R <1is illustrated in Figure 3.
It is seen from (23) that the initially higher spending level is larger the
later taxes are imposed, and that the eventually lower spending level is
smaller the later taxes are imposed. Thus, the longer the delay in the
required contractionary policy the larger are the real effects of exchange
rate management. Moreover, the contractionary policy cannot he delayed at
will, because given a limit on taxing capacity, say x percent of GNP
(possibly hundred percent), taxes which eventually have to equal g(R—1)RT'
cannot exceed x percent of T• These results are in line with the
observed responses of spending and debt to the dissinflation attempts in
Israel during 1982—1983 and in Chile and Argentina during the late seventies.20
The economics behind these results is as follows. The capital gain from
the overvalued currency is appropriated by the individuals who are alive in
period zero. To them the present value of future tax liabilities is smaller
than the capital gain, and they respond by raising spending in all periods.
All future generations face larger tax liabilities and reduce spending; the
later an individual is born the larger his tax liability in present value
terms (except that all those who were born after T.—1 have the same tax
liability). Over time the population share of individuals who were alive at
t=O declines and the share of those with heavier tax liabilities increases.
Therefore, aggregate spending is initially larger and it becomes smaller far
enough in the future.21
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